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ABSTRACT 
The United States Congress recently passed the first federal 
legislation to curb the influx of spam.  However, the Controlling the 
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (“CAN-
SPAM Act”) left some measures to be enacted by the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”), and some consumers are calling for the Act 
to have a broader reach and for the creation of a Do-Not-E-Mail 
registry.  Conversely, the FTC  decided to delay the creation of a 
registry and opted to assist in the development of a new 
technological authentication system.  This iBrief looks at the 
current state of spam and explains that it is too early to tell whether 
the effects of the CAN-SPAM Act warrant new anti-spam measures.  
In addition, it points out that it is questionable whether the FTC’s 
current authentication approach will be effective, and, thus, 
considers the possible First Amendment challenges to a Do-Not-
Call registry as well as other possible anti-spam solutions.  In the 
end, this iBrief postulates that the most effective option might be for 
the FTC to implement both a Do-Not-Email registry and an 
authentication system. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 E-mail has become an integral part of life on the Internet, but like 
many great communication media it has been tainted by unsolicited 
commercial communications; unsolicited commercial e-mail is commonly 
referred to as “spam.”  Spammers recognize the convenience and efficiency 
of e-mail, and make significant profits while interfering with consumer 
usage.  The economics of spam are fairly simple.  A retailer’s goal is to 
maximize profits by minimizing costs,2 and advertising is a cost.3  To 
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maximize the effective use of advertising, the retailer casts as wide a net as 
possible in a direct marketing scheme.4  Since the cost of spam is almost 
negligible, it often makes sense to use e-mail as the primary advertising 
medium.5  
¶2 However, society bears a great cost as a result of spam.  Recipients 
of spam suffer because they, or their employers, must shoulder the 
substantial cost of setting up complex mail servers, maintaining hard drives 
to store the e-mail, and implementing spam filters.6  In addition, in the 
workplace, spam can result in a significant loss of productivity.7  For 
example, because spam is already estimated to constitute over half of all e-
mail traffic,8 there is a concern that if spam increases at its expected 
exponential rate, companies will not be able to support the increased costs 
of bandwidth and hard drive space.9  One study estimates that spam costs a 
business $847 per employee per year in lost productivity alone.10  
Furthermore, society will bear the cost of spam if e-mail becomes a less 
useful form of communication.11   
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5 A spammer can get an Internet connection, buy spam addresses or harvest 
them on his own, buy spamming software, and easily start churning out millions 
of spam messages.  See Peter Griffin, Spammers Remain Unrepentant As They 
Make Money, THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Mar. 21, 2003, available at 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?storyID=3251095&thesection=tech
nology&thesubsection=generalhttp://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?stor
yID=3251095&thesection=technology&thesubsection=general (last visited Nov. 
17, 2004). 
6 Allman, supra note 2; Marguerite Reardon, Finding A Way to Fry Spam, 
NEWS.COM, Feb. 24, 2004, at http://news.com.com/2008-1032-
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Mail, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 325, 338-39 (2001).   
10 Paul Roberts, Report: Spam costs $874 per employee per year, INFOWORLD, 
July 1, 2003, available at 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/07/01/HNspamcost_1.html (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2004). 
11 Spam filters may decrease e-mail’s usefulness as a form of communication 
because spam filters may filter out e-mail that is desired or users may stop using 
e-mail as an integral part of communication.  Reardon, supra note 6.  A 2003 e-
mail study also found that employees spend an average of one hour and 47 
minutes using e-mail, and 86% of respondents found that e-mail made them 
more efficient.  Lisa M. Bowman, E-mail’s up—is the boss watching?, ZDNet, 
June 18, 2003, available at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-1018562.html 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
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¶3 This iBrief looks at the effects of current and proposed federal anti-
spam legislation.  In particular, it considers the possible implementation of a 
Do-Not-Email registry or a new technological authentication process, 
including possible constitutional and logistical challenges.  In the end, this 
iBrief postulates, the most effective option might be for the federal 
government to implement both a Do-Not-Email registry and an 
authentication system. 
I. THE CONTROLLING THE ASSAULT OF NON-SOLICITED 
PORNOGRAPHY AND MARKETING ACT OF 2003 
¶4 Though many states had already enacted anti-spam laws, the United 
States Congress’ first anti-spam action did not come until 2003, when it 
passed the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and 
Marketing Act of 2003 (“CAN-SPAM Act”);12 the CAN-SPAM Act was 
signed into law by President Bush on December 16, 2003 and went into 
effect on January 1, 2004.13  The CAN-SPAM Act largely delineates certain 
requirements for sending commercial e-mail and proscribes ancillary 
methods used by fraudulent spammers to harass consumers.14  Specifically, 
it prohibits the use of false-header information15 and deceptive subject 
headings,16 while requiring that the e-mail contain certain content, such as a 
mechanism to opt-out of receiving future commercial e-mail from that 
sender,17 a warning label if the commercial e-mail contains sexually 
oriented material,18 and the sender’s physical postal address.19  The CAN-
SPAM Act also prohibits many other fraudulent activities associated with 
spam, such as utilizing open relays,20 hacking into computers to facilitate 
                                                     
12 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, § 2 (a)(2), 117 Stat. 2699, 2699 (2004) [hereinafter 
CAN-SPAM Act]. 
13 Id. at § 16. 
14 Id. §§ 4 & 5.  For a concise summary of the requirements and penalties of the 
CAN-SPAM Act, visit 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/canspam.htm (last visited Nov. 
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15 CAN-SPAM Act §§ 4(a)(3) & 5(a)(1). 
16 Id. § 5(a)(2). 
17 Id. § 5(a)(3). 
18 Id. § 5(d). 
19 Id. § 5(a)(5)(A)(iii). 
20 Id. §§ 4(a)(2) & 5(b)(3).  An open relay is an insecure computer used by third 
parties to retransmit e-mail messages.  See Open Relay, WHATIS.COM, at 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci782509,00.html (last updated 
July 19, 2004). 
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the transmission of spam,21 registering for false e-mails or domain names,22 
address-harvesting, and dictionary attacks.23 
¶5 The CAN-SPAM Act was one of many proposed federal 
legislations, and has been highly criticized for not being harsh enough in its 
requirements and limitations. 24  For example, California State Senator 
Bowen (D-Redondo Beach) criticized the CAN-SPAM Act’s adoption of an 
opt-out mechanism, which she found to be weaker than her opt-in 
proposal.25  The CAN-SPAM Act has also been criticized for not 
recognizing a private cause of action.26  Rather, actions must be brought by 
state Attorneys General,27 Internet Service Providers,28 or primarily, the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).29  Despite these criticisms, it is too 
early to tell whether additional measures must be taken by either the FTC or 
by Congress. 
                                                     
21 CAN-SPAM Act § 4(a)(1).  Hacking into a computer is gaining accesses to a 
computer without authorization to use to send multiple transmissions using that 
computer.   
22 Id. § 4(a)(3).  Registering for a false e-mail or domain name is to use a false 
name to represent oneself when registering for an IP address or e-mail.   
23 Id. § 5(b).  Harvesting addresses is using some type of automated method to 
parse web pages or other online forums to gather e-mail addresses.  Dictionary 
attacks are an automated method of creating random e-mail addresses using 
letter combinations that are sent to an e-mail server and then determining which 
addresses are valid, based on responses from the e-mail server.  See Grant Yang, 
CAN-SPAM: The First Step to No-Spam, 4 CHI-K. J. INTEL. PROP. 1, 5 (2004), at 
http://jip.kentlaw.edu/art/volume%204/4-1-2.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2004). 
24 For a listing of proposed legislation from the past three years, see 
http://www.spamlaws.com/federal/index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
25 Susan Kuchinskas, California Senator Slams ‘Can Spam’, CLICKZ NEWS, 
Nov. 14, 2003, at http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3109531 (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2004).  An opt-in system requires recipients to explicitly request to 
receive the e-mail; whereas, in an opt-out system, spammers may send e-mails 
to all but those who explicitly opt-out.  Sorkin, supra note 9, at 374.  Many 
commentators have argued that an opt-in approach is better for consumers partly 
because opting-out takes too much time and also confirms the e-mail address to 
the spammer.  See Richard C. Balough, The Do-Not-Call Registry Model is not 
the Answer to Spam, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 79, 86–87 
(2003). 
26 CANNING SPAM: Federal Government Preempts State Legislation 
Regarding Unsolicited Commercial E-mail Messages, GORDON & GLICKSON 
LAW FORUM, at 
http://www.imakenews.com/ggalert/e_article000222696.cfm?x=a2JKslM,a18jw
lg9 (last visited Sept. 27, 2004). 
27 CAN-SPAM Act § 7(f)(1). 
28 Id. § 7(g)(1). 
29 Id. § 7(a). 
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¶6 The FTC has some flexibility to enact and administer additional 
spam regulations,30 such as creating a Do-Not-E-Mail registry31 or requiring 
additional labeling.32  Such additional regulations may be warranted, as the 
success of the CAN-SPAM Act in its first year has been much-debated.  
Already, AOL cites a 27% decline in spam and an almost 50% decrease in 
daily spam-related complaints from customers over a period from February 
20 to March 17 of 2004.33  On the other hand, some reports have indicated 
that spam volume has risen since 2002.34  It may take some time to 
accurately measure the effect that the CAN-SPAM Act will have on the 
quantity of spam.  Furthermore, there are mixed reviews from the industry 
regarding whether the CAN-SPAM Act will ever be effective.35   
II. DO-NOT-E-MAIL REGISTRY 
¶7 One potential expansion of the CAN-SPAM Act, which may 
implicate First Amendment issues, is to implement a Do-Not-E-Mail 
registry.  The CAN-SPAM Act gave the FTC six months from its date of 
                                                     
30 Id. § 13. 
31 Id. § 16. 
32 Id. § 11(2). 
33 AOL Chew Fat on Sliced Spam, REUTERS, Mar. 19, 2004, available at  
http://news.com.com/2100-1024-5176278.html?tag=nefd_hed (last visited Nov. 
17, 2004). 
34 Spam Volume Keeps Rising, NEWS.COM, Sept. 1, 2004, at 
http://news.com.com/Spam+volume+keeps+rising/2100-1032_3-
5339257.html?tag=nefd.top (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
35 Compare CAN-SPAM Act: Full Committee Hearing, 108th Cong. (2004) 
(statement of Ronald Scelson, Scelson Online Marketing) (stating that “CAN 
SPAM Act is working and working well”), available at 
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1199&wit_id=2094   
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004), with CAN-SPAM Act: Full Committee Hearing, 
108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Peter Brondmo, Senior Vice President, Digital 
Impact, Inc.) (asserting that “the CAN Spam Act is unlikely to eliminate the 
hard core spammers, especially those sending viruses and perpetrating 
‘phishing’ attacks – the most dangerous form of spam”), available at 
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1199&wit_id=3438 (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2004).  In other words, some think the CAN-SPAM Act can act 
as a deterrent, whereas others view that the difficulty of finding and catching 
spammers will not deter the particularly hard-core spammers.  Therefore, even 
with a cause of action, it is argued that spammers may not be deterred.  
However, this begs the question of whether harsher penalties are needed to deter 
spammers from flagrantly violating CAN-SPAM; the current sentencing 
guidelines for CAN-SPAM are already being criticized as too harsh by the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.  Paul Festa, Stiff Spam 
Penalties Urged, NEWS.COM, Apr. 14, 2004, at http://news.zdnet.com/2100-
1009_22-5191651.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
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enactment to study the feasibility and effectiveness of establishing a Do-
Not-E-Mail registry.36  In June 2004, the FTC released a report delineating 
its findings, and advised against implementing a Do-Not-E-Mail registry at 
that time.37  The FTC considered three potential types of Do-Not-E-Mail 
registries: “a registry of individual email addresses, a registry of domains, 
and a registry combined with a certified third-party email forwarding 
service.”38  The first two types of registries are intuitive:  that is, a user can 
register an e-mail address or a domain name and spammers would not be 
allowed to send to those addresses or domain names.39  The third type of 
registry considered allows a spammer to submit his distribution list to an 
FTC-approved third party forwarding service, which then matches the e-
mails on the distribution list with those on the Do-Not-E-Mail registry and 
forwards the spam to those users not on the registry.40  After considering all 
three registry types, the FTC determined that there were significant security 
and privacy concerns,41 general technical concerns,42 and obstacles to 
enforcement.43 
¶8 The proposal of a Do-Not-E-Mail registry has received popular 
support from the general public.44  Some have even said that the registry is 
integral to the CAN-SPAM Act’s success.45  Many spam opponents feel that 
spam legislation should employ an opt-in mechanism,46 and the registry 
                                                     
36 CAN-SPAM Act § 9. 
37 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, NATIONAL DO NOT EMAIL REGISTRY: A 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ii (2004) [hereinafter “REPORT TO CONGRESS”], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/dneregistry/report.pdf (last visited Nov. 
17, 2004). 
38 Id. at 13. 
39 Id. at 14-15. 
40 Id. at 15. 
41 Id. at 15-23. 
42 Id. at 26.  
43 Id. at 23-26 (stemming largely from the difficulty of tracking spammers and 
forcing them to obey the law). 
44 Pamela Parker, Do-Not-Spam Proves Popular Concept, CLICKZNEWS, Dec. 
23, 2003 (study showed that 84% of Americans were extremely or very likely to 
register on a Do-Not-Spam registry), at 
http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3292361 (last visited Nov. 17, 2004),  
45 Do-Not-Spam List Is Crucial to Make Current Law Work, THE MERCURY 
NEWS, Feb. 20, 2004, available at 
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/opinion/7998096.htm. 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
46 Stefanie Olsen, California ‘Disempowered’ By Federal Spam Law, 
NEWS.COM, Jan. 22, 2004 (stating that the Federal Spam law preempted the 
stronger California anti-spam law which was opt-in and gave individuals more 
power against spam), 
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would make the CAN-SPAM Act a de facto opt-in law.47    Meanwhile, 
others, like FTC Chairman Tim Muris, have expressed serious doubt about 
the registry’s effectiveness.48  In addition, some opponents are concerned 
that it would just give spammers millions of valid e-mail addresses to 
spam.49   
¶9 Most importantly, an effective registry must be robust in order to 
counteract the weaknesses mentioned in the report.  For example, use of 
third-party intermediaries would provide the most security; however, the 
FTC found that doing so would “deprive legitimate bulk e-mailers of key 
marketing data.”50   The FTC further argued that the use of such a system 
would increase the cost to legitimate marketers and take away “key 
components to any marketing strategy – measuring the success of the 
campaign and understanding the customer.”51  Thus, although a registry 
would further protect consumer privacy, it also has the potential to impinge 
on legitimate marketers’ First Amendment rights.  To determine whether an 
expanded Do-Not-E-Mail registry could withstand constitutional scrutiny, it 
is helpful to examine the legal precedent provided by the recent judicial 
challenge to the Do-Not-Call registry. 
¶10 The Do-Not-Call registry is “a list containing the personal 
telephone numbers of telephone subscribers who have voluntarily indicated 
that they do not wish to receive unsolicited calls from commercial 
                                                                                                                       
 at http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-5145849.html?tag=st_rn (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2004).  
47 A registry would require a one-time opt-out and thereafter the user would 
need to opt-in to receive commercial e-mail.  
48 FTC Chief’s Doubts On Do-Not-Spam List Remain, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 
12, 2004, (Chairman Muris had expressed doubt about the registry even before 
the passage of the CAN-SPAM Act), available at 
http://www.wral.com/technology/2919192/detail.html (last visited Mar. 20, 
2004); David Ho, FTC Chair: Do-Not-Spam List Won’t Help, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Aug. 19, 2003, available at 
http://www.crn.com/sections/BreakingNews/dailyarchives.asp?ArticleID=44014 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
49 Janis Mara, FTC Requests Vendor Input on Do-Not-Spam List, CLICKZNEWS, 
Feb. 24, 2004, at http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3316911 (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2004). In fact, one scam website tried to set itself up as a registry in 
order to fool people into providing their e-mail addresses.  “Do-Not E-mail” 
Site a Scam, U.S. Officials Say, REUTERS, Feb. 13, 2004, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-02-13-no-spam-list-scam_x.htm 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004).  See also Marc Simon, The CAN-SPAM Act of 
2003: Is Congressional Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail 
Constitutional?, 4 J. HIGH TECH. L. 85, 93-94 (2004), available at 
http://www.jhtl.org/V4N1/JHTL_Simon_Note.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2004) 
50 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 37, at 28. 
51 Id. at 30-31. 
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telemarketers.”52  The Do-Not-Call registry, originally established under the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,53 is a joint effort between the 
FTC and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) under the Do-
Not-Call Implementation Act,54 and both agencies have promulgated the 
rules governing the Do-Not-Call registry.55  Under the Do-Not-Call registry 
regulations, telemarketers have up to three months to remove phone 
numbers listed on the registry from their call lists; however, only personal 
phone numbers may be listed56 and the list does not apply to non-
telemarketers, such as political organizations, charities, telephone 
surveyors, or companies with which consumers have an existing 
relationship.57   
¶11 In Mainstream Marketing Services Inc. v. FTC,58 the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently upheld the constitutionality of the 
Do-Not-Call registry, holding that it did not violate the limited First 
Amendment protection provided to commercial speech.59  The Supreme 
Court uses a form of intermediate scrutiny in evaluating commercial 
speech.60  In Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission,61 the 
Supreme Court articulated a four-part intermediate scrutiny analysis used to 
determine whether a government regulation violates commercial expression 
under the First Amendment: (1) the speech must concern lawful activity and 
not be misleading; (2) the government interest must be substantial; (3) the 
regulation must directly advance that government interest; and (4) the 
regulation must not be more extensive than necessary to serve that 
                                                     
52 Mainstream Mktg Servs., Inc. v. F.T.C., 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). 
53 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 
2394 (1991) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §227 (1994)). 
54 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10, § 3, 117 Stat. 557, 557 
(2003). 
55 16 C.F.R. §310.4 (FTC rule); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.  Both agencies also 
maintain their own websites regarding the Do-Not-Call registry.  The FTC has a 
website at http://www.ftc.gov/donotcall/, and the FCC has a website at 
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/donotcall/.  Registration is available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/donotcall/.   
56 Business-to-business calls are not covered by the Do-Not-Call registry.  Q&A: 
The National Do Not Call Registry, National Do Not Call Registry, at 
https://www.donotcall.gov/FAQ/FAQConsumersNew.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 
2004). 
57 Information for Consumers, National Do Not Call Registry, at 
https://www.donotcall.gov/FAQ/FAQConsumers.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 
2004). 
58 Mainstream Mktg Servs., Inc. v. F.T.C., 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). 
59 Id. at 1233. 
60 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1047 (2d ed. 2002). 
61 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
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interest.62  The Tenth Circuit applied the Central Hudson test and provided 
four reasons why the Do-Not-Call registry is consistent with the First 
Amendment’s requirements.63  The court’s reasoning readily applies to a 
potential Do-Not-E-Mail implementation.   
¶12 First, the Mainstream Marketing court emphasized that only core 
commercial speech is restricted by the Do-Not-Call registry.64  The law 
clearly defined the scope of content to include only commercial speech, and 
as such, it fell within the constitutional purview of the Central Hudson test. 
Similarly, the CAN-SPAM Act only targets commercial speech.65  
However, the FTC could make this analysis more difficult if it pushes the 
limit of its discretion concerning the implementation of a Do-Not-E-Mail 
registry.66  For example, if the FTC expanded the registry to reach non-
commercial political speech, the registry would not be protected by the 
Mainstream Marketing precedent.67 
¶13 Second, the court acknowledged that the government had two 
justifiable interests, thus passing the second prong of the Central Hudson 
test.  The Do-Not-Call registry was meant to protect individual privacy in 
the home and protect consumers against “fraudulent and abusive 
solicitation.”68  The court stated that the home is a “personal sanctuary that 
enjoys a unique status in our constitutional jurisprudence.”69  These interests 
would also apply to consumers using personal e-mail.  However, while the 
Do-Not-Call registry only applies to personal phone numbers,70 an effective 
Do-Not-E-Mail registry would also need to include business e-mail 
addresses.  Many of the costs of spam are incurred by businesses through 
lost productivity and technology costs, and businesses generally invest more 
in costly anti-spam programs than individuals do.71  Thus, under a 
potentially expanded Do-Not-E-Mail registry, a court would have to also 
determine whether decreasing the burden on businesses is a justifiable 
government interest.   
                                                     
62 Id. at 566.  
63 Mainstream Mktg. Servs., 358 F.3d at 1233, 1236. 
64 Id. 
65 CAN-SPAM Act § 4. 
66 Id. § 9(a). 
67 The Tenth Circuit explicitly stated that their opinion did not serve as 
precedent for political and charitable callers.  Mainstream Mktg. Servs., 358 
F.3d at 1233 n.2.   
68 Id. at 1237. 
69 Id. at 1233 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988)). 
70 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) (2003). 
71 Deborah Fallows, Spam: How It Is Hurting Email and Degrading Life on the 
Internet, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, Oct. 22, 2003, at 19, at  
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Spam_Report.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 
2004). 
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¶14 Third, the Mainstream Marketing court addressed the issue of 
choice, as the Do-Not-Call registry acts as an opt-in program that leaves 
choice in the hands of the consumers.72  It found that the Do-Not-Call 
registry materially furthers the government’s interests of combating the 
danger of abusive telemarketing and preventing the invasion of consumer 
privacy, thus fulfilling the third prong of the Central Hudson test.73  In this 
same manner, a Do-Not-E-Mail registry would put the power to receive or 
prevent spam in the hands of consumers.  The CAN-SPAM Act states that it 
forwards a substantial government interest in that it protects consumers 
from the fraudulent aspect of spam and provides them the right to decline 
commercial e-mails.74  Thus, a Do-Not-E-Mail registry would further the 
government interest of protecting consumers by putting the power in the 
hands of the consumer to determine whether or not to receive unsolicited 
commercial e-mails. 
¶15 Fourth, the Do-Not-Call registry was challenged under the last 
factor of the Central Hudson test which requires that the commercial speech 
regulation be “narrowly tailored,” but not necessarily the least restrictive 
means.75  The Tenth Circuit found that the Do-Not-Call regulation is 
narrowly tailored because it is a proportional response to the government 
interest.76  The appellees in Mainstream Marketing, who were telemarketing 
companies, contended that there were alternative approaches that could be 
taken to fulfill the government’s interests; however, the court struck each of 
them down.  For example, telemarketers suggested that consumers could 
make company-specific opt-out requests,77 but the court found that only 
having a company-specific approach is “seriously inadequate to protect 
consumers’ privacy from an abusive pattern of calls.”78  Telemarketers also 
argued that the government could employ less restrictive technological 
alternatives to stop unsolicited phone calls; however, the court recognized 
that such alternatives would not only place the cost of unwanted calls on 
                                                     
72 Mainstream Mktg. Servs., 358 F.3d at 1233, 1238. 
73 Id. at 1233, 1241-42. 
74 CAN-SPAM Act § (2)(b); see also Mainstream Mktg. Servs., 358 F.3d at 1237 
(finding that the government’s justifications of protecting individuals’ privacy 
and fraudulent and abusive solicitation are “undisputedly substantial 
governmental interests”). 
75 Id. at 1237. 
76 Id. at 1238.  The Tenth Circuit found that “do-not-call prohibits not only a 
significant number of commercial sales calls, but also a significant percentage 
of all calls” and that commercial sales calls are exactly the type that Congress is 
seeking to redress.  Id. at 1242–42. 
77 Id. at 1244. 
78 Id. 
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recipients, but would also be ineffective as technological advances have 
been made to circumvent blocking techniques.79 
¶16 In the same manner, spam advertisers may argue that there are 
ample alternatives to implementing a Do-Not-E-Mail registry; however, 
because spam and telemarketing have many of the same characteristics and 
alternatives, the Mainstream Marketing arguments may also apply to a Do-
Not-E-Mail challenge.80  Under the current CAN-SPAM Act scheme a 
consumer only has a company-specific opt-out option.81  It is questionable 
how effective this option will be in stopping spammers, and it shifts the 
burden to the consumer to opt-out of each company’s mailing list.  This is 
in contrast to the Do-Not-Call registry, by which telemarketers are charged 
with removal of the phone numbers listed on the registry from their call 
lists; however, only personal phone numbers may be listed82 and the list 
does not apply to non-telemarketers, such as political organizations, 
charities, telephone surveyors, or companies with which consumers have an 
existing relationship.83   
¶17 An effective Do-Not-E-mail registry would not only be narrowly 
tailored, but welcomed by consumers because it would allow them to opt-
out only once, similar to the Do-Not-Call registry.84  As with telemarketing, 
there are many spam blocking technologies; however, they have proven to 
be both costly and ineffective.85  The Tenth Circuit found a registry to be 
the most efficient for consumers, and unlike the current scheme of the 
CAN-SPAM Act, where an e-mail user can only opt-out from each 
individual solicitation, a registry provides one easy means to “erect a wall . . 
. that no advertiser may penetrate without [the registered party’s] 
acquiescence.”86     
                                                     
79 Id. at 1245. 
80 Id. at 1244–46. 
81 CAN-SPAM Act § 5(a)(5)(ii). 
82 Business-to-business calls are not covered by the Do-Not-Call registry.  Q&A: 
The National Do Not Call Registry, National Do Not Call Registry, at 
https://www.donotcall.gov/FAQ/FAQConsumersNew.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 
2004). 
83 Information for Consumers, National Do Not Call Registry, at 
https://www.donotcall.gov/FAQ/FAQConsumers.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 
2004). 
84 Whether or not this would be effective is also questionable, as suggested by 
the FTC report; however, this minimally puts a law-abiding company on notice 
and gives the enforcing agencies statutory means to protect the consumer. 
85 See Yang, supra note 23, at 30–35. 
86 Mainstream Mktg. Servs., 358 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Rowan v. Post Office, 
397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)).  
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¶18 The Tenth Circuit correctly found that the Do-Not-Call registry was 
constitutional, and a constitutional challenge against a Do-Not-E-Mail 
registry would face many of the same issues.  However, a successful Do-
Not-E-Mail registry would inevitably need to be a more encompassing 
registry than a Do-Not-Call registry, given that a large amount of spam is 
sent to both consumers and businesses87 and also because the general nature 
of e-mail is such that users can check their personal or business e-mail 
wherever they are.  If only personal e-mails could be registered, the 
nuisance aspect of spam could still occur in the home because the nature of 
e-mail allows many users to frequently check their business e-mail from 
home and vice versa.   
¶19 While the Direct Marketing Association (“DMA”), one of the 
appellees in Mainstream Marketing, decided not to appeal the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision, the American Teleservices Association announced that it 
would appeal the case to the Supreme Court88 and did so in May 2004.89  
However, the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari.90  The Tenth 
Circuit’s holding thus stands, and is not only instrumental in protecting 
consumers but also serves as significant precedent for the Do-Not-E-Mail 
registry.91   
¶20 If created, a Do-Not-E-Mail registry would be more difficult to 
administer than a Do-Not-Call registry,92 and it is possible that the FTC may 
be “emboldened enough to create a do-not-email registry broader than the 
                                                     
87 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 37, at 1. 
88 Caroline E. Mayor, Telemarketers Split on Appeal of Do-Not-Call, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 4, 2004, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A28821-2004Mar3&notFound=true  
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
89 Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. F.T.C., 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), 
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 14, 2004) (No. 03-1552). 
90 Mainstream Mktg. Servs v. F.T.C.., 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. 
denied, 2004 WL 2050134 (2004). 
91 In fact, both the DMA and the American Association of Advertising Agencies 
oppose the creation of a Do-Not-E-mail registry.  Declan McCullagh, Court 
Upholds Do Not Call List, NEWS.COM, Feb. 17, 2004, at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1028-5160690.html (last modified Feb. 17, 2004).  
Furthermore, some experts believe that a Do-Not-E-mail challenge would track 
a Do-Not-Call precedent.  Id.  
92 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 37, at 16.  Some administrative problems 
are: security/privacy concerns, difficulty in enforcement because of spammers’ 
abilities to hide their identities, difficulty in tracking spammers, difficulty 
obtaining subpoenas to obtain the information necessary to file cases against 
spammers, and the vast number of e-mail addresses.  Id. at 15-26. 
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telephone registry [and] . . . go for noncommercial e-mail.”93  If the FTC 
created a registry outside the bounds of the Tenth Circuit’s holding, such as 
one allowing the registration of business e-mails or the restriction of non-
commercial e-mail, this could possibly incite marketing trade groups to 
make First Amendment challenges.  However, the costs of spam and 
telemarketing are different and there are other significant justifications, such 
as the nuisance of pornographic spam,94 which could justify farther reaching 
provisions of a Do-Not-E-Mail registry. 
III. OTHER SOLUTIONS SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE 
¶21 Given the time necessary to study the effects of the CAN-SPAM 
Act and the potential First Amendment challenges, Congress is not likely to 
amend the Act to give it any more force.  Therefore, the FTC is left to either 
implement a registry or look to alternative non-statutory solutions, most of 
which are not susceptible to attack under the First Amendment.  For 
example, an e-mail tax would severely hinder the cost-efficiency of spam, 
and though it would have to pass intermediate scrutiny, 95 such a measure 
would likely pass a First Amendment challenge because it would apply to 
all e-mail.96  In addition, various Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have 
proposed technical solutions to verify the validity of an e-mail and its 
origin.97   
                                                     
93 Id. 
94 Unlike annoying telemarketing, pornographic spam affects individual 
consumers; that may justify an argument for “privacy” equal to that of personal 
e-mail.  A Pew Research study showed that pornographic spam causes the same 
embarrassment and emotional reaction that would be manifested in personal e-
mail, and in some situations may cause employees to lose their jobs.  See 
Fallows, supra note 71, at 29-31. 
95 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 903 
96 Id. at 903 (stating that “A law regulating speech is content-neutral if it applies 
to all speech regardless of the message . . . .  For example, a sales tax, applicable 
to all purchase including of reading material, might have a significant incidental 
effect on speech, but it is content-neutral.”).  Similarly, a tax on all e-mail would 
be similar to requiring a stamp on all postal mail.  A person would have to affix 
the stamp on regardless of the mail’s content.  Also, due to the prevalence of e-
mail in all businesses with very little differential taxation on the press, it would 
be unlikely that a tax would be construed as an unconstitutional special taxation.  
See id. at 1123. 
97 E-mail Identity System Proposed to Combat Spam, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 
27, 2004, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/internet/02/27/email.origins.ap/index.html 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
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¶22 Many of the suggested technical solutions require some type of key, 
authentication, or identification process.98  In fact, in its June 2004 report, 
the FTC suggested that it will convene a Federal Advisory Committee to 
consider an authentication process99 in lieu of a Do-Not-E-Mail registry.100  
Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center (EPIC), cautions that while digital certificates requiring 
identification of a sender are allowable for commercial speech, they would 
most likely violate First Amendment protections of political or religious 
speech.101  However, while the Supreme Court has held that laws that ban 
anonymity on political literature are unconstitutional, there would be a 
question if this requirement of anonymity could be applied to technological 
standards implemented by private ISPs, particularly when the 
implementations are completely content-neutral.102  Most likely, unless ISPs 
are regarded as state actors,103 those who send unsolicited e-mails would be 
unable to make First Amendment challenges against ISPs,104 as the First 
Amendment only protects against speech regulated by the government.105  
Thus, if private ISPs and other technology companies take the initiative on 
their own to create an e-mail standard, they would be able to defend against 
First Amendment challenges.   
                                                     
98 See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 37, at 35-37.   
99 Id. at 36. 
100 Id. at 34-35.  Technological solutions, such as authentication, have received 
much support from technology companies, such as AOL.  CAN-SPAM Act: Full 
Committee Hearing, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Ted Leonsis, Vice 
Chairman, America Online, Inc.), available at 
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1199&wit_id=3436  
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
101 Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
Testimony and Statement of Record Before the Committee on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation, May 21, 2003, available at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/junk_mail/spam/spamtestimony5.21.03.html (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
102 See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 
362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
103 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 1103 (“There is not a right to use private 
property owned by others for speech.  Because it is private property, the 
Constitution does not apply.”). 
104 The Supreme Court has concluded that the First Amendment does not create 
a right to use privately owned shopping centers for speech.  Hudgens v. Nat’l 
Labor Relations Bd., 424 US 507, 520-21 (1976).  If ISPs were to be regarded as 
an entity similar to a shopping center, where the general public has access to the 
traffic of the privately owned ISPs, then ISPs would not be required to offer 
network access to spammers. 
105 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 894. 
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¶23 However, it is problematic to implement these technical 
solutions.106  Furthermore, getting the major e-mail providers to agree on a 
single protocol will be extremely difficult.107  The FTC, anticipating these 
hurdles, is considering mandating an authentication protocol.108  A 
government-imposed technological standard may not be advisable, but it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss those issues.  Authentication may 
even work best with a registry, rather than in lieu of a registry.109  Currently, 
spammers can exploit the e-mail system because the identity of the e-mailer 
is unverifiable.110  In the same way, a major problem with the Do-Not-E-
Mail registry is the fear that spammers may illegally use the registry e-mails 
to continue spamming while avoiding detection because of their inability to 
be traced.111  If the FTC implements a Do-Not-E-Mail registry with an 
authentication system in place, this may very well be more effective than 
only implementing a registry. 
CONCLUSION 
¶24 Although many spam scholars are calling for the expansion of the 
current CAN-SPAM legislation, there is still time to determine whether the 
current legislation will make an impact on spam.  The Spamhaus Project’s 
Register of Known Spam Operations has found that 90% of all spam comes 
from 200 spam groups.112  Some on the list, such as Bernard “Merlin” 
Balan, who Canada.com News dubbed the “King of Spam,” have since 
retired.113  However, the CAN-SPAM Act provides a Damoclean sword for 
those spammers who wish to take Balan’s place among the spamming elite, 
and has caused many to be wary of sending spam.114        
                                                     
106 Yang, supra note 23, at 30-34. 
107 See Jim Hu, AOL Drops Microsoft Antispam Technology, NEWS.COM, Sept. 
16, 2004, at 
http://news.com.com/AOL+drops+Microsoft+antispam+technology/2100-
1032_3-5369915.html?tag=nefd.top (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).  AOL has 
already backed out of Microsoft Sender ID, while Yahoo supports Domain 
Keys.  Id. 
108 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 37, at 36. 
109 Id. at 37 (finding that the FTC would consider a registry if “an authentication 
system is in place, and if other technological developments removed the security 
and privacy risks associated with a Registry.”). 
110 Id. at 12. 
111 Simon, supra note 49, at 106. 
112 Register of Known Spam Operations, THE SPAMHAUS PROJECT, at 
http://www.spamhaus.org/rokso/index.lasso (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). 
113 Gary Dimmock, The King of Spam, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Mar. 11, 2004 (on 
file with author). 
114 Saul Hansell, Unrepentant Spammer to Carry on, Within the Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/30/technology/30spam.html (last 
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¶25 Hopefully, an authentication implementation will be able to stem 
the increasing flow of spam.  However, if the amount of spam does not 
decrease, the statutory requirements of the CAN-SPAM Act will need to be 
expanded and further expansion will undoubtedly test the limits of free 
speech.  Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision stands as a significant precedent.   An emboldened FTC may 
consider creating an expansive Do-Not-E-Mail registry alongside an 
effective authentication system, which together would add to the growing 
arsenal in the war on spam.  In fact, this may be necessary to appease the 
various anti-spam organizations and corporations that are tired of fighting 
an ever-increasing amount of spam.      
                                                                                                                       
visited Nov. 17, 2004).  Alan Ramsky, one of the top 200 ROKSO spammers, 
expressed his concern about the CAN-SPAM Act and stated, “You would have 
to be stupid to try to violate [the CAN-SPAM Act].” Id. 
